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CLUB THEORY
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ABSTRACT
The theory of clubs addresses the gap between purely private and
purely public goods, being concerned with how groups (‘clubs’)
form to provide themselves with goods that are available to their
membership, but from which others (non-members) can be
excluded. Despite 35 years of formal development, there have
been virtually no laboratory studies of club formation. We develop
the ‘social poker’ laboratory paradigm toward ﬁlling this gap, and
test the predictions from club theory that populations will partition
into a privately and socially optimal set of clubs. The experiment
included three conditions: (1) ‘Single shot’ with one trial of club for-
mation; (2) ‘iterated’ with a sequence of four trials; and (3) ‘iterated
dollar-guarantee’, with four trials in which participants who were
not included in clubs still earned a small amount of money. In all
conditions, clubs were frequently larger than was privately or collec-
tively optimal; in the second condition, clubs were increasingly
likely to include unnecessary members across trials. After clubs
formed, members had the opportunity to ‘overclaim’ – to take
more than their agreed-upon share of the club good. Although the
incidence of overclaiming was low, it was more common in larger
clubs, further reducing the collective earnings of participants.
KEY WORDS . club goods . efﬁciency . inclusion . social
dilemma
As ﬁrst articulated by Buchanan (1965), a ‘club’ is a ‘consumption
ownership-membership arrangement’ justiﬁed for its members by
the economies of sharing production costs of a desirable good. The
theory of clubs addresses the ‘awesome Samuelson gap’ (Buchanan
1965: 548) between purely private goods and purely public goods –
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that is, between goods that are privately produced and for which
individuals have exclusive use rights, and goods that are jointly pro-
duced and for which exclusion is not possible. Pure public goods
allow no exclusion; pure private goods are completely exclusive.
Buchanan was surely correct in recognizing that the space between
pure public goods and pure private goods (from which all others
are excludable) needed to be addressed.
A generation later, Cornes and Sandler (1996: 347) deﬁned a club
as ‘a voluntary group of individuals who derive mutual beneﬁt from
sharing one or more of the following: Production costs, the mem-
bers’ characteristics, or a good characterized by excludable beneﬁts’.
As they and others have emphasized, club goods – what clubs pro-
duce – are like public goods in so far as, once produced, they are
available to more than one individual. But they are like private
goods in so far as explicit exclusion is possible. The American Socio-
logical Association, for example, demands fees from those who reap
the beneﬁts it provides, just as those who swim in the Downtown
Athletic Club’s pool must pay the Club’s membership fee or
expect to be (politely?) asked to leave. In both cases, the resource
is available to all members. Yet these clubs can and do restrict mem-
bership, either by keeping membership costs high (beyond the range
of most residents) or through other explicit criteria (professional
standing, for example). In short, the theory of clubs accommodates
the fact that some goods can be simultaneously available to a deﬁned
and ﬁnite population and subject to explicit exclusion. This provides
a solution to some of the more intractable and pervasive problems
with public goods. Free-riding on the cost of producing club
goods, for example, is prevented if membership fees are a condition
of some unit of consumption.
Two implications of these special characteristics of clubs have
been developed in the extensive formal literature since Buchanan.
First, a market for club goods can develop, with individuals in a
wider population forming clubs or shopping around for existing
clubs that satisfy their taste for quality and their willingness to pay
for quality. Continuing the swimming pool example, some swimmers
will be willing to pay the higher fees at the Downtown Athletic Club
in order to have fewer swimmers per lane, while others will prefer the
lower cost of the YMCA pool, with its more crowded lanes.
Second, just as a market for private goods enables buyers and
sellers to sort themselves into a socially optimal set of binary
exchanges, a market for club goods enables a population of people
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to ‘partition’ themselves into clubs with particular clubs representing
optimal consumption choices for their members (Pauly 1967, 1970),
and with the set of clubs being an optimal partition for the popula-
tion as a whole (Cornes and Sandler 1996). There are information
problems, of course; people will seldom have complete information
about the options available, but in the long run we can expect a
socially optimal distribution of individuals among clubs by their
tastes and by their willingness to pay. In a town with only a Down-
town Athletic Club and a YMCA, for example, swimmers will even-
tually distribute themselves between those two clubs as a function of
their willingness (and ability) to pay and their willingness to tolerate
crowded lanes. Other outcomes are also possible. Swimmers may
forgo joining either club and use the local swimming hole (which
is freely available to all), or (if they are sufﬁciently wealthy) arrange
for a private pool to be installed at their house. Similarly, should
demand in the town exceed the capacity of those two clubs, resulting
in prospective members being excluded due to excessive overcrowd-
ing, entrepreneurs (including, perhaps, disgruntled swimmers) may
eventually open a third club, expanding the available choices.
While the laboratory study of behavior in markets for both
private and public goods has ﬂourished since the early 1970s, a
review of relevant journals turned up only one laboratory study of
behavior within a club framework (Battalio et al. 1986), and the
participants in this study were not people, but rats. We attribute
this lacuna to the lack of a laboratory paradigm adapted to studying
club-related market behavior among humans and take a step toward
ﬁlling it by introducing a new laboratory paradigm (‘Social Poker’)
for studying club formation. We then report ﬁndings from a social
poker study that tested the central prediction from club theory:
Individuals who cannot realize their interests by private action but are free to seek
out partners in a group effort will partition into a set of clubs that is both socially
and privately optimal.
In this context, ‘socially optimal’ means that the resources distribu-
ted across members of the wider population are used efﬁciently to
increase aggregate wealth – in the swimming pool case, to provide
a set of pools that cater optimally to the distribution of tastes and
willingness to pay. ‘Privately optimal’ means that individuals
make the best possible use of the resources that they hold, given
the distribution of tastes and resources within the population.
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Club theory recognizes that the quality of club goods can be
degraded not only by crowding effects, but also by the misbehavior
of individual members (Buchanan 1965; Cornes and Sandler 1996) –
for example, by their inconsiderate behavior in swimming lanes.
In club theory, the sanctions of expulsion or fees graduated accord-
ing to an individual’s pattern of use can be invoked to prevent
members from damaging a club good. But that implies monitoring,
and interest attaches to whether, absent appropriate monitoring,
participants will, in fact, over-exploit such a resource. The basic
ﬁnding from the extensive social dilemma laboratory tradition is
that behavior does not match strong predictions from rational
choice models; even in single-shot PD games without monitoring,
some substantial incidence of cooperative behavior is a standard
ﬁnding (e.g. Orbell et al. 1986, 1988).
Standard social dilemma laboratory paradigms do not, however,
allow participants to form their own groups, as is envisioned within
the club theoretical paradigm and implemented in the social poker
laboratory paradigm to be described next (Arrow et al. 1999).
There is also no formal basis for predicting that self-selection into
clubs will alter the incidence of cooperative behavior. The incentive
to exploit others remains despite self-selection. Nevertheless, we
consider it plausible that the dynamics underlying cooperation and
exploitation might be substantially modiﬁed if people are free to
choose their membership groups, based on ﬁndings on partner
choice in the psychological literature (e.g. Tziner and Eden 1985).
Accordingly, we also report ﬁndings about the incidence of exploita-
tive behavior in clubs.
The Laboratory Study of Clubs
In this section, we spell out the key elements of club theory that
informed our study.
1. A population of participants each hold resources that can be con-
tributed toward the generation of a club good. Club theory requires
that the average per-person cost of producing the club good is
lower than the cost of producing the same good privately. Other-
wise, there is no reason for a club to form in the ﬁrst place, and no
incentive for individuals to join.
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2. Clubsmust offer goods that potential members will value. Buchanan
(1968) proposed that a variety of clubs would form that would
suit the ‘tastes’ of members for different types of beneﬁts. In
our laboratory paradigm, we wanted to ensure that the club
goods would be something all participants would value. Money
was the most convenient numeraire for this purpose.
3. Participants are free to search for others with whom to form a club.
This follows from Cornes and Sandler’s (1996: 347) deﬁnition
of a club as ‘a voluntary group’. Little theoretical attention in
club theory has been directed to the mechanisms by which
clubs form in the ﬁrst place or to the motives of members for
forming (as opposed to joining) a club. Thus our focus on the
self-organization of members into clubs is consistent with, but
not explicitly speciﬁed by, club theory. This feature is essential,
however, to study our main question of interest – whether or
not people in a deﬁned population will actually partition them-
selves into a socially and privately optimal set of clubs.
4. Allow more than one club to form within the population of partici-
pants. The club paradigm requires that comparison shopping
among clubs be possible, thus that there be more than one alter-
native club for individuals to choose among.
5. The club good is subject to overcrowding and to overuse by particu-
lar members. Quality can be eroded for members by overcrowd-
ing – too many swimmers per lane, for example. In response,
club members can ‘vote with their feet’ (Tiebout 1956) by
moving to a different club. Overuse of the resource by particular
club members (exploitation) can also erode quality for other club
members. A possible response is to expel these particular mem-
bers from the club.
6. Clubs have the power to determine their own membership. As
Buchanan stressed in his original formulation, a key distinction
between club goods and public goods is excludability. Clearly,
if clubs must accept all applicants for membership, regardless
of qualiﬁcations or ability to pay, then the distinction between
clubs and general public goods is lost. Hence clubs must have
the power to reject prospective members to limit overcrowding,
and the power to expel particular members who degrade the
club good through overuse, failure to contribute, or other forms
of exploitation.
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The Social Poker Laboratory Paradigm
In this section we describe how these elements of club theory were
implemented in the social poker paradigm. We then describe pro-
cedures and experimental conditions for the empirical study.
Participants and Resources In the standard game of poker, the
player who forms the best hand of cards – or the best bluffer – cap-
tures the pot to which all have contributed. In social poker, each
participant is also dealt some cards, but no player has enough
cards to form a hand alone. Instead, players must seek out others
with whom to pool their cards to form a hand and earn a collective
payoff (the club good). A club can form only by the free agreement
of all potential members. Individuals attempting to form a club are
free to include or reject any other individual who indicates an inter-
est in joining – fulﬁlling the ‘possibility of exclusion’ criterion.
Payoffs (the Club Goods) In the experiment reported here, accept-
able hands were limited to three pairs or four of a kind. Either one
earned the club $10. The distribution of cards was arranged so that it
was possible for each player to form one of these hands by joining
with two other players. No two players had the right cards to
form a hand, ensuring that the minimum club size would be three.
Freedom to Choose Partners Social poker participants are free to
search for others who hold complementary cards and form a club
with them – subject, of course, to such individuals’ willingness to
accept them. A club is considered to be formed when all members
agree on who is and who is not a member. Potential members are
free to reject the offers of others, and emergent clubs are free to
reject additional members once they have garnered the cards to
form one of the speciﬁed hands.
More Than One Club Can Form Although laboratory paradigms
for studying coalition formation give people resources that they
are able to pool productively and include the freedom to choose
partners (Komorita and Kravitz 1983; Murnighan and Roth 1980),
only a single winning coalition can form at one time. In social
poker, more than one club can form simultaneously, allowing for
members to choose among clubs, and vice versa. All clubs that
form successful hands receive the $10 payoff ( just as multiple ﬁtness
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clubs can offer swimming pools as a member beneﬁt). Although
multiple clubs may be in competition for members, they can simul-
taneously produce useful club goods. Club formation is thus not a
zero sum game.
Clubs are Subject to Overcrowding and Exploitation Although the
card distribution ensures that at least three people are needed to
form a successful hand, clubs are free to admit more members. If
they do, club goods (the $10 earned) will be shared across more
than three people. Participants make private claims on the resource
once it has been produced, and have the opportunity to exploit the
group by claiming more than their share. ‘Overclaiming’ erodes the
value of group earnings, as explained in more detail in the next
section. A larger number of members directly creates overcrowding
(more claims on a ﬁxed amount of club goods) and also logically
increases the risk that at least one member will overclaim, further
degrading the beneﬁts of membership.
Experimental Design
Participants Three-hundred-and-sixty-six University of Oregon
students (100 males, 266 females) participated. Of these, 267 were
Caucasian, 40 were Asian, 14 were ‘mixed’, 9 were Hispanic,
5 were Native American, and 3 were African American; the remain-
ing participants did not indicate ethnic background. The average age
of participants was 20. Along with their earnings in the experiment,
they received credit in a psychology course for their participation.
The sign-up sheet directed people not to sign up for a session if
they recognized the name of anyone who had already signed up.
Procedure After giving informed consent, eight participants read
an instruction sheet explaining the rules of social poker and took
a quiz that tested their comprehension of the rules. Examples of
both three- and four-person groups were given in the instruction
sheet, so that it would be clear that they were allowed to form
clubs larger than three if they wished. The experimenter then
reviewed the rules, checked people’s answers on the quizzes, and
explained in more detail any points on which people were confused.
The key rules were (1) two social poker hands, four of a kind or three
pairs, were both worth $10; (2) to make a hand, players had to form
groups (we did not use the word club) and pool their cards – trading
CROSSON ET AL.: ‘SOCIAL POKER’ 231
 at BOSTON COLLEGE on February 14, 2015rss.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
cards was not allowed; (3) each group could turn in only one hand;
(4) after groups discussed the division of earnings, members would
make private claims – which could be any even dollar amount
between $0 and $10 – on the group earnings; and (5) if aggregate
claims were $10 or less, every member would receive what he or
she claimed, but if aggregate claims exceeded $10, each member
would be penalized 50 cents for each dollar ‘overclaimed’ by the
group. For example, if one member claimed $10 and two claimed
$3 (for a total group claim of $16), each would be ﬁned $3
(6 0:50), so one member would make $7 while the other two
would make nothing (if penalties exceeded claims, players earned
nothing).
The instructions encouraged players to discuss the division of
money before they made claims, but stressed that their actual
claims would be strictly private. Players understood that they
would be paid whatever they earned, but they would not be told
what others members had claimed.
Once the experimenter was satisﬁed that everyone understood the
game, each participant donned a runner’s bib displaying their player
number and received three playing cards and an information sheet
that showed who had what cards – meaning that everyone played
under full information about what cards each other player could
contribute. After they had time to study the distribution and
decide whom they would like to form a group with, players
assembled in the middle of the room to seek out partners. Players
forming groups were instructed to move to one of three tables
located in the corners of the room.
After groups formed, they signaled to the experimenters that they
had a hand, and the experimenter checked to be sure there was con-
sensus about the membership of the group. Any people sitting at the
table who were not included as group members were asked to go to
another table at this time, and all the cards were collected. Group
members were instructed to turn their chairs around so that they
were facing away from the rest of the group, and they then com-
pleted a claim form and a questionnaire. Isolates (those not belong-
ing to a group) received an alternative questionnaire. After claims
were tallied, each group member was privately given a chit that indi-
cated what he or she had earned for that trial. At the end of the
experiment, participants completed a ﬁnal questionnaire that
asked whether they and other club members had ‘promised’ to
abide by any agreement about the distribution of the $10 club
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good, with the deﬁnition of ‘promised’ being left to participants.
Participants then went one by one to a debrieﬁng area where they
exchanged their chits for cash.
Experimental Conditions There were three experimental condi-
tions. In the single-shot condition, participants played only one
trial and knew in advance that only one trial would be completed.
In the iterated condition, participants played four trials. They
were told that they would play between 2 and 10 trials, so they
knew at the outset that there would be multiple trials but did not
know that the fourth trial was the last.1 In a dollar guarantee con-
dition, participants who did not get included in a club (some
group members did not contribute any cards to the hand, but only
people left out of groups got the $1 guarantee). This was clearly
explained in the instructions, and any such ‘isolates’ were given a
chit for $1 at the end of each group formation trial. Otherwise,
procedures were identical to the standard iterated condition.
The single-shot condition is the simplest representation of the
process of club formation, as it is not complicated by any expecta-
tion of future interaction among club members. The iterated con-
dition, by incorporating multiple trials, allows us to investigate
expected ‘over time’ effects such as responses to overcrowding.
The dollar-guarantee condition adds the feature that individual
resources that could be used as contributions to club goods would
also be worth something privately (the $1 payoff). In some natural
world club-formation situations, resources can only be used as con-
tributions toward a club good; that is the case, for example, with
skills used in team sports. But in many others the resources that
people might contribute (such as membership fees) have alternative
uses, and this condition recognizes that possibility.
In those conditions involving multiple trials, participants made
private claims and received a chit for their earnings after each
trial. They then returned to the middle of the room, received new
cards, and repeated the club formation process. They were free to
seek out either the same or different partners with whom they had
formed a group in previous trials.
We ran 15 replications in each of the 3 conditions. Thus 30 clubs
could form in the single-shot case, and 2(clubs) * 4(trials) * 15(repli-
cations) ¼ 120 clubs could form in each of the two iterated con-
ditions. In two cases (one in the single-shot condition, one in the
standard iterated condition), only 7 people showed up for the
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experiment. These cases are excluded from analyses of average club
size.
Expected Results
In this section we describe the expected pattern of results for the
three conditions on two outcomes: club size and the incidence of
overclaiming.
Optimal Partitioning of People into Clubs
The primary prediction from club theory is that, in a relatively ‘fric-
tionless’ environment in which there is complete information about
clubs (and hence no transaction costs of seeking out this informa-
tion), people will partition into a set of clubs that is both socially
and privately optimal. For the single-shot and standard iterated
conditions, the optimal result for the population of participants in
a given trial would be to form two clubs (of any size between
three and ﬁve members), each of which would earn $10, extracting
from the experimenters the maximum $20. For the third condition,
when isolates received $1, the social optimum for the population of
participants would be to partition into two minimally sized groups,
with two isolates. Total wealth extraction would then be at the
maximum of $22. From the perspective of the individual, the best
outcome in every condition is to be included in a minimally sized,
three-person group; adding extra people increases the number of
claims on the $10 and also increases the risk of overclaiming. This
leads to the primary ‘optimal partition’ prediction for club size:
1a. In all conditions, participants will reliably partition themselves into
two clubs of size three
In the dollar-guarantee condition, the difference between payoffs for
isolates and group members was reduced. Isolates received $1, less
than the $3.33 expected value for members of minimally sized
clubs, but more than the $0 payoff for isolates in the other two con-
ditions. Taken together, this suggests that, while the privately opti-
mal club size is three in every condition, three-person clubs should
be most commonly observed in the dollar-guarantee condition, the
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only condition where it is also the collectively optimal solution for
extracting wealth from the experimenters.
1b. Trial 1 optimal partitions: Dollar-guarantee > Single-shot &
Standard iterated
In market theory generally, predictions to socially optimal equi-
libria – for example, of supply and demand – are often recognized
as predictions in the long run (e.g. Alchian 1950; Hayek 1979).
Thus, if participants do not partition themselves into an optimal
set of clubs on the ﬁrst attempt, optimal partitions should become
increasingly common through iterated sequences as individuals
experience the costs of overcrowding and act to resolve the problem
by excluding extra members.
1c. Optimal partitions over time, for iterated conditions: Later trials>
earlier trials
Overclaiming
In all conditions, the private earnings for an individual are highest if
he or she gains membership in a minimal (three-person) club and
makes the maximum claim on the club good, while neither of the
other members does so. Of course, if all individuals act thus in the
hope that others will behave responsibly while they do not, the net
result will be that claims total $30, so that $10 is subtracted from
each person’s claim and no one earns anything. In the dollar guar-
antee condition, participants whose analysis of the game leads
them to expect this result should prefer the guaranteed $1 payoff
and decline to form or join a club.
If the club has more than three people making claims, the pros-
pects for increasing one’s earnings by overclaiming worsen, as
even a more modest degree of overclaiming per member (an average
$7.50 claim) will sufﬁce to reduce earnings to zero.
When one expects to interact repeatedly, however, the expectation
of future interaction can provide some restraints on such mis-
behavior. Hence we predict the following:
2a. Trial 1 overclaiming: Single shot > Dollar-guarantee & Standard
iterated
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Even if more members behave cooperatively at ﬁrst in the iterated
conditions, they are unlikely to continue to do so if others are
exploiting the group. Thus, even with the shadow of the future
(Axelrod 1984) acting to constrain member behavior when there
are multiple trials, we expect that some people will, indeed, over-
claim, inspiring some formerly cooperative people to overclaim in
turn, producing a negative spiral.
2b. Overclaiming over time, iterated conditions: Later trials > earlier
trials
One empirically demonstrated solution to the problem of negative
spirals of defection is promising. Universal promise-making is
known to have a positive impact on cooperation in social dilemma
experiments (Komorita 1996; Orbell et al. 1988, 1990, 1991; Ostrom
et al. 1992). Because the logic of overclaiming in a social dilemma
game is the same as the logic of overclaiming from a club good
once provided, we make the following prediction for all conditions.
2c. Overclaiming: Universal promising < Absence of universal
promising
Consideration of the expected pattern of overclaiming leads to a
reﬁnement of the predictions for club size. If the incentive to over-
claim is indeed strongest in the single-shot condition, and the
prospects for successful exploitation fall sharply when additional
members are admitted, then this should further increase the incen-
tive to ensure that clubs are as small as possible in order to achieve
a privately optimal result. Hence we make the following adjustment
to the club size predictions:
1d. Trial 1 optimal partitions: Single-shot > Standard iterated (&
possibly < dollar-guarantee).
Findings
Club Size
Overall, the manner in which participants partitioned into clubs pro-
vided only modest support for the core prediction of club theory (1a)
that people would reliably partition themselves into an optimal
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arrangement of clubs. Across all 115 trials that included 8 partici-
pants, only 55 (48%) resulted in the optimal set of two 3-person
clubs. The incidence of optimal partitions was highest in the single-
shot (60%) and dollar-guarantee (52%) conditions, lowest (25%) in
the standard iterated condition, in line with prediction 1d, and par-
tially consistent with prediction 1b (dollar guarantee lower than
standard iterated).
To conﬁrm that people’s behavior reliably departed from the
predicted optimum of three-person clubs, we ran single-sample
t-tests comparing mean club size with the predicted size of three.
Departures were signiﬁcant (0.05 level) in every trial. The strongest
departures were in the standard iterated condition, with club size
signiﬁcantly higher than 3 in all trials (p < 0:001, t [13] values
ranged from 4.66 to 6.9). Club size for each condition is shown in
Figure 1, and means and standard deviations are given in Table 1.
A one-way analysis of variance comparing club size across condi-
tions for trial 1 found no signiﬁcant differences between conditions.
Average club size, however, was signiﬁcantly lower in the single-shot
condition compared to the standard iterated condition when we
collapsed across trials for the latter condition, tð26Þ ¼ 2:71,
p < 0:02, increasing our statistical power.
If we ask how many of the 30 sets of people in the two iterated
conditions consistently partitioned themselves into optimal, mini-
mally sized clubs across trials, the results are even less supportive
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of club theory. In the standard condition, only 3 of 15 (20%) and in
the dollar guarantee condition, only 4 of 15 (27%) did so. They also
showed no inclination to reduce overcrowding over time. To test
the over-time prediction (1b) for the two iterated conditions, we
conducted a repeated measures analysis of variance with trial and
condition as the two factors and average club size as the outcome
variable. Results indicated a signiﬁcant difference in club size
between the two iterated conditions, Fð1; 27Þ ¼ 6:03, p < 0:03 (stan-
dard iterated clubs were smaller) and a signiﬁcant interaction
between trial and condition, Fð3; 25Þ ¼ 3:53, p < 0:03. Closer
examination of the interaction revealed a linear increasing trend
in the standard iterated condition, Fð1; 13Þ ¼ 3:46, p < 0:09, and a
quadratic U-shaped trend in the dollar-guarantee condition,
F ð1; 14Þ ¼ 3:86, p ¼ 0:07 (see Figure 1). The pattern for the stan-
dard condition thus showed a trend opposite to the one predicted.
Overclaiming
Contrary to prediction 2a, club members were not more likely to
overclaim in the single-shot condition, with overclaiming occurring
in 23% of single-shot clubs, compared with 40% of clubs in the stan-
dard iterated and 27% of clubs in the dollar-guarantee conditions
for Trial 1. For that trial, the average claim in single-shot clubs
($10.73, SD ¼ 2:8) was also lower than in the standard ($11.60,
SD ¼ 3:3) and dollar-guarantee ($10.90, SD ¼ 2:6) iterated con-
ditions. The difference in means is attributable to the different
incidence of larger-than-optimal clubs in the different conditions
(as shown in Figure 1); when club size is controlled for, condition
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Table 1. Average Club Size, by Condition and Trial
Trial 1 Trial 2 Trial 3 Trial 4 All Trials
Single shot (N ¼ 28) 3.29 (0.46)*
Standard iterated
(N ¼ 28 per trial)
3.61 (0.69) 3.68 (0.67) 3.79 (0.50) 3.79 (0.42) 3.71 (0.58)
(N ¼ 112)
Dollar guarantee
(N ¼ 30 per trial)
3.47 (0.69) 3.30 (0.60) 3.30 (0.54) 3.40 (0.62) 3.37 (0.61)
(N ¼ 120)
All conditions 3.45 (0.63) 3.48 (0.66) 3.53 (0.57) 3.59 (0.56)
* Values in parentheses are standard deviations.
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did not predict overclaiming. (Table 2 gives means and standard
deviations for claims across club sizes and trials.)
Contrary to prediction 2b and to ﬁndings from studies of iterated
social dilemmas that cooperation tends to decline over trials (e.g.
Isaac et al. 1985), we found a signiﬁcant linear trend toward fewer
groups overclaiming over successive trials in iterated conditions of
social poker, 2 ð1Þ ¼ 4:08, n ¼ 240, p < 0:05. The Spearman’s
correlation was 0:13, again signiﬁcant at 0.05 level. A further un-
expected pattern was that many clubs underclaimed, submitting
total claims (and hence realizing collective earnings) of less than
the full $10 (see Table 2). In fact, when all clubs in all conditions
are considered, the incidence of underclaiming (20% of clubs
formed) rivaled that of overclaiming (24% of clubs formed).
To further investigate patterns over time for the iterated con-
ditions and to check our assumption about group size effects, we
conducted an analysis of variance with trial and club size (optimal
or larger) as the two factors and claims as the outcome variable (con-
dition was excluded as a factor because it had no impact beyond
group size). Results conﬁrmed that clubs larger than three had a
more serious overclaiming problem, Fð1; 232Þ ¼ 6:69, p ¼ 0:01. No
effect for trial and no interaction was evident.
Of course, the size effect need not indicate a greater propensity of
members to overclaim in larger groups, since a ﬁxed level of per-
member overclaiming results in worse total overclaiming at the
club level in larger groups – simply because there are more members
involved. To investigate this issue, we re-ran the analysis with mean
member overclaim ([club claim  10]/club size) as the dependent
variable. Larger clubs still had a worse problem, indicating that
per-member overclaiming is exacerbated by club size, although the
ﬁnding was not as strong, Fð1; 232Þ ¼ 3:69, p < 0:06. Inspection of
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Table 2. Average Claims, by Club Size and Trial, Iterated Conditions Only
Trial 1 Trial 2 Trial 3 Trial 4 All Trials
Size 3 $10.97 (2.8)* $11.06 (2.6) $9.97 (0.72) $9.96 (1.4) $10.54 (2.2)
ðN ¼ 34Þ ðN ¼ 36Þ ðN ¼ 30Þ ðN ¼ 27Þ ðN ¼ 127Þ
Size 4 or 5 $11.62 (3.2) $11.33 (3.8) $11.90 (4.7) $11.24 (3.4) $11.52 (3.8)
ðN ¼ 26Þ ðN ¼ 24Þ ðN ¼ 30Þ ðN ¼ 33Þ ðN ¼ 113Þ
All groups $11.29 (3.0) $11.19 (3.13) $10.93 (3.5) $10.63 (2.8)
* Values in parentheses are standard deviations.
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the means (see Table 3) revealed a notable contrast between the
ﬁrst two and the last two rounds. The difference in per-member
claiming between smaller and larger groups appears to develop in
the last two rounds, when members of three-person groups under-
claim, on average. This post hoc ﬁnding proved statistically reliable
when the ﬁrst two rounds were contrasted with the second two
rounds for 3-person groups, tð95Þ ¼ 2:99, p < 0:005 (n ¼ 127, cor-
rection for unequal variance used). There was no over time differ-
ence for larger groups.
Promising
In their questionnaire reports, club members often did not agree
about whether everyone in the group had promised to claim the
agreed-upon amounts. Thus we sorted clubs into three categories,
those with universal promising ðn ¼ 84Þ, those with no promising
ðn ¼ 30Þ, and those in which promising was either incomplete or
imperfectly recalled (i.e. member reports disagreed, n ¼ 154), and
ran a one-way ANOVA, which indicated that promising did have
a signiﬁcant effect on group claims, Fð2; 265Þ ¼ 12:13, p < 0:001.
As expected on the basis of social dilemma laboratory ﬁndings,
universal promising was quite effective in preventing overclaiming
(M ¼ $10.27, SD ¼ 1.65), but so was ‘partial’ promising (M ¼
$10.88, SD ¼ 2.64). Both had signiﬁcantly lower mean claims than
clubs with no promising (M ¼ $13.30, SD ¼ 5.72). To test for the
combined effect of club size and promising, we followed up with
a two-factor analysis of variance that included two levels of
club size (optimal or larger) and three levels of promising (none,
partial, and universal). Results indicated a signiﬁcant interaction,
Fð2; 262Þ ¼ 8:78, as well as signiﬁcant main effects for club size,
240 RATIONALITY AND SOCIETY 16(2)
Table 3. Per-Member Overclaim, by Club Size and Trial
Trial 1 Trial 2 Trial 3 Trial 4 All Trials
Size 3 $.32 (0.93)* 0.35 (0.87) 0.01 (0.24) 0:01 (0.47) 0.18 (0.72)
ðN ¼ 34Þ ðN ¼ 36Þ ðN ¼ 30Þ ðN ¼ 27Þ ðN ¼ 127Þ
Size 4 or 5 0.38 (0.76) 0.33 (0.96) 0.48 (1.2) 0.31 (0.85) 0.37 (0.95)
ðN ¼ 26Þ ðN ¼ 24Þ ðN ¼ 30Þ ðN ¼ 33Þ ðN ¼ 113Þ
All groups 0.35 (0.86) 0.34 (0.90) 0.23 (0.88) 0.17 (0.72)
* Values in parentheses are standard deviations.
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F(1, 262) = 23.2, and promising, F(2, 262) = 21.0, all p < 0.001.
The nature of the interaction is clearly evident in Figure 2: The
impact of club size on overclaiming is most evident when club
members make no promises to one another about what they will
claim. These ﬁndings provide further evidence that overuse of a
shared resource can be mitigated by group members ‘discovering’
the age-old institution of promising.
Discussion
Club theory proposes a decentralized, non-coercive process by
which a population will partition into a set of clubs with (1) each
producing club goods for consumption by its members – but not
by non-members; with (2) different clubs offering a trade-off
between price and quality that is optimal for each club’s members;
and with (3) the partition itself being optimal at the aggregate or
population level. As sketched at the outset, Buchanan’s (1965) criti-
cal insight was that the free-rider problem that bedevils the provision
of pure public goods can be solved if exclusion is possible, by making
an appropriately gauged contribution to the club a condition of
access. ‘Overcrowding’, which degrades the quality of club goods,
can still develop, but it can be addressed by limiting membership
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Figure 2. Total Claims by Club Size and Promising
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or by excluding members who make excessive claims on club goods.
The predicted outcome is that, generally, valued goods that cannot
be produced by individuals acting alone (or that are prohibitively
expensive for most individuals to provide privately) will be produced
in a socially optimal manner.
Our main focus in this paper was to test this prediction using a
laboratory paradigm that models the process of endogenous club
formation. The experiment included conditions that model different
types of resources – those that are only useful in producing a collec-
tive product and those that are ‘fungible’ – i.e. that can yield beneﬁts
outside of a club. We also included a ‘single-shot’ condition in which
the actions of participants would not be affected by the expectation
of future interaction.
Why Did Clubs Tolerate Overcrowding?
The primary prediction of club theory, that populations of people
will partition themselves into clubs that are privately and socially
optimal, was not reliably supported in this study. Instead, clubs
frequently included more members than necessary to provide the
club good. As expected, the incidence of optimal partitions did
vary across conditions and trials. Although the pattern was not as
predicted, these variations provide clues about the countervailing
pressures that encourage club members to admit more than the mini-
mally necessary number, reducing their individual beneﬁts as a
result. Optimal partitions were most common in the single-shot con-
dition and were more common in the dollar-guarantee condition
than in the standard iterated condition in which those not admitted
into either club earned nothing. In the standard iterated condition,
the propensity to include more people also tended to increase over
time.
Together, these results suggests that potential club members will
be more willing or able to hold the line against overcrowding
when (1) those petitioning for entry beyond the socially optimal
number are complete strangers – rather than people one has already
encountered as fellow members of a different club; when (2) these
petitioners will remain strangers – i.e. there is no expectation of
future interaction once the petition has been rejected; and when
(3) petitioners will not be left completely empty-handed if they are
turned away – i.e. when the welfare of potential ‘isolates’ does not
depend entirely on their sharing a successfully produced club good.
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An anecdote from a real-life club may help illustrate the psychol-
ogy that seems to be involved. Arrow has been serving as a con-
sultant for a writer’s group that is currently closed to new
members. Ten people are on the waiting list, but no new members
are currently being admitted, and most members agree that the
group is already larger than optimal for the provision of club
goods – in this case, critiques of stories by members. Despite the
recognition that admitting more members will worsen the over-
crowding and further degrade the payoffs for each member, many
club members are unhappy with the continuing exclusion of the
wait-listed members, and this is particularly true for members who
know and like those waiting to be admitted. The pool of identiﬁed
potential members for this club is considerably larger than in our
laboratory experiments, a minimum of 35 counting current members
plus the waitlist, compared with a pool of 8 in the social poker study.
Yet we observe the tendency in both the laboratory and this natural
world case to admit more members than what club members agree is
the optimal number.2
The larger population involved in the writer’s club suggest that
our results are not necessarily applicable only to very small popula-
tions. The similarities, especially to our standard iterated condition,
are also suggestive: (1) the membership decisions are made collec-
tively by the club membership; (2) the club has, over time, continued
to accept new people even after recognizing that the group was
already too large; and (3) the petitions are typically made in
person, to existing members of the group. While other writer’s
clubs do exist in the city, petitioners typically are not interested in
these other clubs – they do not suit their tastes either because of
how the clubs operate or the type of writing that is emphasized.
Thus petitioners on the waitlist are out ‘in the cold’, so to speak,
having no attractive alternatives – which makes the situation
psychologically more like the standard iterated condition than our
dollar-guarantee condition.
One clear boundary condition for our ﬁndings, we believe, is the
face-to-face interaction involved and the corresponding intro-
duction of social motives and pressures, such as concern for the
welfare of others, especially those with whom one has had some
prior interaction. As Field (2001) has proposed, rationality-based
predictions appear to be more successful in games against nature
than in closely interpersonal circumstances, and club theory – like
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market theory more generally – can be understood as substantially
concerned with such games against nature.
Two different perspectives on club theory, and subsequent courses
of action, are suggested by this analysis. One is to retreat from the
study of people interacting face to face, which invariably evokes
social inﬂuences that complicate the situation. Paradigms in which
people make choices without interacting with others, for example,
might effectively model such collectives as supermarket ‘clubs’, in
which people pay a club fee and get a good price on goods bought
in bulk. Such paradigms would not apply to ﬁtness centers or
writers’ clubs, in which people interact, form attachments, and
directly observe the behavior of others.
The second approach is to follow the lead of Cornes and Sandler
(1996) in expanding the theory and study of self-organized club
formation, acknowledging that the hoped-for beneﬁts that inspire
people to organize themselves into clubs, and the costs they pay in
the process, can include beneﬁts and costs of a ‘social’ nature.
This leads us to question whether our deﬁnition of the ‘optimal’ par-
tition for the social poker experiment is actually too narrow because
it fails to account for costs and beneﬁts that go beyond the money
involved.
In a separate social poker experiment in which participants
reported on the reasons behind their choice of partners and their
satisfaction with the clubs they formed, it became apparent that
people’s ‘tastes’ for clubs were based on a balance between economic
self-interest and equity motives (Arrow and Burns 2004). Some
people were most satisﬁed in minimally sized groups; others
expressed greatest satisfaction in larger groups. Judging the latter
type of club as suboptimal hardly seems a satisfactory application
of club theory if such arrangements provide the balance of beneﬁts
that its members prefer. Just as experimental results from laboratory
studies of social dilemma behavior suggest that qualiﬁcations are in
order about the importance of the free-rider problem, the results
from our social poker experiments suggest that qualiﬁcations are
in order about the optimality of a population’s partitioning into a
set of clubs. In both cases the qualiﬁcations appear to derive from
humans’ willingness to incorporate, to some extent at least, the
welfare of others into their own decision-making processes.
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Why Was Overclaiming So Low?
The potential of members to ‘overuse’ club goods, which is
embedded in the social poker paradigm and also envisioned by
club theory, is analogous to the public goods problems modeled
by other social dilemma paradigms. Including this feature helped
increase the costs of overcrowding – which we wanted to be steep
enough to affect participant behaviour – and also allowed us to
replicate and extend previous ﬁndings in the social dilemma litera-
ture that include the freedom to choose partners (e.g. Orbell and
Dawes 1993; Yamagishi and Hayashi 1996).
As expected, we found that overclaiming is worse in larger groups,
in part simply because there are more people who could misbehave,
and in part because people are actually more likely to overclaim in
larger groups. This is in line with the voluminous literature in
social psychology indicating that problems such as free-riding and
social-loaﬁng are exacerbated by group size. While promise-
making did not reduce the cost of sharing the ﬁxed good among a
larger number, it was effective in reducing overclaiming and had
a particularly strong impact in larger groups. Promise-making, of
course, is most likely to arise when people interact face-to-face,
underlining the importance of this feature in our study design.
Although the logic of maximizing private self-interest suggested
that members of single-shot clubs should be especially likely to
attempt to exploit their fellow club members, participants were no
more likely to overclaim in this condition, and in fact, overclaiming
was both relatively infrequent and relatively mild when it did occur.
Underclaiming, which maximizes no member’s earnings, and in fact
reduces the total income of the club, was almost as common. Invari-
ably, this outcome occurred when club members agreed to make
equal claims: $3 each in a 3-person group or $2 each in a 4-person
group. Members of fully one-ﬁfth of the clubs formed were willing
to collectively forgo $1 or $2 in potential earnings in order to achieve
equity among members. This surprising ﬁnding, like the popularity
of ‘overcrowded’ clubs, strongly points to the importance of non-
ﬁnancial incentives in our participants’ behavior.
NOTES
Research for this paper was funded by NSF SES-9729320 to Holly Arrow and John
Orbell. We are grateful for help from K.L. Burns, Psychology, and Bill Harbaugh,
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Economics, at the University of Oregon. Ruth Bennett contributed helpfully to the
development of the social poker laboratory paradigm. We are also indebted to the
undergraduate research assistants of the Small Groups Laboratory and to members
of the weekly seminar of the Hill Center for Social Cognition and Decision Making
of the Institute of Cognitive and Decision Sciences for helpful comments. Corre-
sponding author: John Orbell, jorbell@uoregon.edu.
1. We chose to keep participants in the dark about how many trials they would play
so that the four trials would be comparable in terms of anticipated future inter-
action. They would invariably differ, of course, based on the accumulated history
of past interaction. Telling participants in advance howmany trials there would be
makes each trial ‘unique’ in a different sense, and might inspire special strategies
based on calculations of the fourth trial being the last, the third trial being the
penultimate trial, and so on.
2. The brief questionnaire that group members ﬁlled out privately after every trial of
social poker asked whether they would like to be with the same group of people
in the second round. An unpublished honor’s thesis that analyzed the responses
(Rivinis 2003) found that people in smaller clubs were signiﬁcantly more likely
to answer ‘yes’, indicating that the tendency to form larger clubs is not necessarily
evidence that people privately prefer this outcome.
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